

## **INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL PRECONDITIONS AND FEATURES OF THE ORIGIN AND ENDOGENEITY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXTS**

The article is dedicated to theoretical and methodological outlining and analysis of institutional and non-institutional preconditions and features of the origin and endogeneity of electoral systems. It was stated that at the present stage of the development of Political Science this issue needs its “restoration”, “revival” or “renewal” given the fact that today, especially with the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization and the processes in contrast, including autocratisation of a number of countries of the world, there is a diversification of institutional and non-institutional factors, preconditions and features of the origin and endogeneity of electoral systems. The author found that the factors of the origin and endogeneity of electoral systems, on the one hand, should be divided into institutional and non-institutional ones, and on the other hand – into historical, political, social, economic, technocratic, external and accidental ones.

*Keywords: elections, electoral system, political institutions, political parties and blocs, the origin and endogeneity of electoral systems.*

## **INSTYTUCJONALNE I NIEINSTYTUCJONALNE UWARUNKOWANIA I CECHY POCHODZENIA I ENDOGENNOŚCI SYSTEMÓW WYBORCZYCH: KONTEKST TEORETYCZNY I METODOLOGICZNY**

Artykuł jest zarysem teoretycznym i metodologicznym oraz analizą instytucjonalnych i pozainstytucjonalnych uwarunkowań oraz cech pochodzenia oraz endogeniczności systemów wyborczych. Stwierdzono, że na obecnym etapie rozwoju politologii kwestia ta wymaga jej „przywrócenia”, „odrodzenia” czy „odnowy”, biorąc pod uwagę fakt, że dziś, zwłaszcza wraz z początkiem „trzeciej fali” demokratyzacji i w przeciwieństwie do procesów, w tym autokratyzacji wielu krajów świata, występuje zróżnicowanie czynników instytucjonalnych i pozainstytucjonalnych, warunków wstępnych i cech pochodzenia oraz endogeniczności systemów wyborczych.

Autor uznał, że czynniki genezy i endogeniczności systemów wyborczych z jednej strony należy podzielić na instytucjonalne i pozainstytucjonalne, z drugiej – na historyczne, polityczne, społeczne, ekonomiczne, technokratyczne, zewnętrzne i przypadkowe.

*Słowa kluczowe: wybory, system wyborczy, instytucje polityczne, partie i bloki polityczne, geneza i endogeniczność systemów wyborczych.*

## **ІНСТИТУЦІЙНІ ТА ПОЗАІНСТИТУЦІЙНІ ПЕРЕДУМОВИ Й ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ПОХОДЖЕННЯ ТА ЕНДОГЕННОСТІ ВИБОРЧИХ СИСТЕМ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ КОНТЕКСТ**

У статті в теоретико-методологічному контексті виокремлено та проаналізовано інституційні та позаінституційні передумови й особливості походження та ендогенності виборчих систем. Констатовано, що на сучасному етапі розвитку політичної науки означена проблематика потребує свого «відновлення», «відродження» чи «оновлення» з огляду на той факт, що сьогодні, особливо з початком «третьої хвилі» демократизації і процесів на протипагу їй, зокрема автократизації низки країн світу, відбулось і відбувається урізноманітнення інституційних та позаінституційних чинників, передумов й особливостей походження і ендогенності виборчих систем. Встановлено, що чинники походження та ендогенності виборчих систем, з однієї сторони, потрібно поділяти на інституційні та позаінституційні, а з іншої сторони – на історичні, політичні, соціальні, економічні, технократичні, зовнішні й випадкові.

*Ключові слова:* вибори, виборча система, політичні інститути, політичні партії і блоки, походження та ендогенність виборчих систем.

Electoral systems are certainly the main area of interest of political experts and scholars. But the issue of elections is extremely broad and diverse, although it mainly concerns the study, identification and comparison of the effects of different types of electoral systems and the formula of different countries and regions of the world. Instead, the issue of electoral systems is far from limited to this aspect, as in the research environment there are often analytical cases that address the preconditions and features of the origin and endogenousness of electoral systems, both in theoretical and methodological and practical empirical contexts. However, in most of the scientific community, this issue is largely positioned as “forgotten” or even solved. Although, in fact, it definitely needs its “restoration”, “revival” or “renewal” given the fact that today, especially with the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization and processes in opposition to it, including the autocratization of several countries, there is a diversification of institutional and non-institutional factors, preconditions and features of the origin and endogeneity of electoral systems. Their consideration may provide additional answers regarding not only the understanding of the nature and nature of electoral systems, but also their effects in different institutional and political environments. Therefore, the presented scientific article mainly focuses on the theoretical and methodological aspects of institutional and non-institutional preconditions and features of the origin, development and endogenousness of electoral systems in the modern world.

The stated problems of different times were reflected in the scientific achievements of such scientists as K. Benoit and J. Schieman<sup>1</sup>, A. Blais and L. Massicotte<sup>2</sup>, C. Boix<sup>3</sup>, D. Brady and J. Mo<sup>4</sup>, A. Carstairs<sup>5</sup>, P. Dunleavy and H. Margetts<sup>6</sup>, M. Duverger<sup>7</sup>, J. Ishiyama<sup>8</sup>, A. Lijphart<sup>9</sup>, A. Reynolds and B. Reilly<sup>10</sup>, W. Riker<sup>11</sup>, S. Rokkan<sup>12</sup> and many others. However, it needs to be updated and systematized, in particular in view of the latest and traditional features of regulation and conditioning of electoral systems by various institutional and non-institutional contexts, and so on.

In this regard, we certainly proceed from the remark of M. Duverger that the electoral systems of different countries are a kind of “state cameras and projectors” that record images that are partly created by electoral systems themselves, and partly dependent on other institutional and non-institutional factors<sup>13</sup>. This initial conclusion of the researcher is based on his initial / early opinion that the election rules and therefore the electoral systems form and operationalize the party systems and inter-party relations of certain countries, etc<sup>14</sup>., which inevitably lead to “current concerns” about the consequences of electoral systems by studying their political or non-political origins. On the other hand, it is obvious that the party systems themselves inevitably produce, or at least must produce, certain institutional and non-institutional effects on electoral systems, and thus this process is interdependent and interpenetrating. The point is, as M. Duverger notes<sup>15</sup>, that within the framework of such an idea and position, political parties and blocs and party systems in general are inevitably formed and generated, including by electoral institutions and institutes, and in particular by electoral systems that identify and act both “mechanical” and “psychological” pressure on voters and political parties and blocs / coalitions themselves. Moreover, you describe the purely “mechanical” effect of electoral systems,

<sup>1</sup> Benoit K., Models of electoral system change, *“Electoral Studies”*2004, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 363-389; Benoit K., Schieman J., Institutional choice in new democracies: bargaining over Hungary’s 1989 electoral law, *“Journal of Theoretical Politics”*2001, vol 13, nr. 2, s. 159-188

<sup>2</sup> Blais A., Massicotte L., Electoral formulas: a macroscopic perspective, *“European Journal of Political Research”*1997, vol 32, s. 107-129.

<sup>3</sup> Boix C., Setting the rules of the game: the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies, *“American Political Science Review”*1999, vol 93, nr. 3, s. 609-624

<sup>4</sup> Brady D., Mo J., Electoral systems and institutional choice: a case study of the 1988 Korean elections, *“Comparative Political Studies”*1992, vol 24, nr. 4, s. 405-430.

<sup>5</sup> Carstairs A., *A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe*, Wyd. Allen and Unwin 1980

<sup>6</sup> Dunleavy P., Margetts H., Understanding the dynamics of electoral reform, *“International Political Science Review”*1995, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 9-29

<sup>7</sup> Duverger M., *Which is the best electoral system?*, [w:] Lijphart A., Grofman B. (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*, Wyd. Praeger 1984.

<sup>8</sup> Ishiyama J., Transitional electoral systems in post-communist Eastern Europe, *“Political Science Quarterly”*1997, vol 112, nr. 1, s. 95-115.

<sup>9</sup> Lijphart A., *A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994

<sup>10</sup> Reynolds A., Reilly B., *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, Wyd. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 1997

<sup>11</sup> Riker W., The two-party system and Duverger’s law, an essay on the history of political science, *“American Political Science Review”*1982, vol 76, s. 753-766

<sup>12</sup> Rokkan S., *Citizens, Elections, Parties*, Wyd. Universitetsforlaget 1970

<sup>13</sup> Duverger M., *Which is the best electoral system?*, [w:] Lijphart A., Grofman B. (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*, Wyd. Praeger 1984

<sup>14</sup> Duverger M., *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, Wyd. Wiley 1951, s. 34

<sup>15</sup> Duverger M., *Which is the best electoral system?*, [w:] Lijphart A., Grofman B. (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*, Wyd. Praeger 1984

as electoral rules and formulas limit the space and mandates that can be obtained as a result of the distribution of votes. Instead, the “psychological effect” is mainly related to the formation of political parties and blocs and the strategies of individual voters and the electorate in general in anticipation of “mechanical” restrictions on the electoral function, and hence electoral systems. Summing up this theoretical and practical position of M. Duverger, another well-known researcher W. Riker<sup>16</sup> states that today in the research political science literature there are at least two blocks of issues, including “mechanical” and “psychological”, which in various ways illustrate the feasibility of scientific consideration and systematization of issues of the institutional and non-institutional preconditions and features of the origin and endogeneity of electoral systems.

Nevertheless, despite the rather progressive achievements in this field of analysis of political science and comparative studies, today much more emphasis is placed on the study of adaptation of political parties and candidates to electoral institutions than on the way and means of electoral institutions, in particular electoral systems adapted to political parties and candidates, etc. In this regard, J. Cebelis<sup>17</sup> notes that political experience has repeatedly shown that when political actors really maximize their goals and interests, in particular by adapting their strategies to political institutions, they also automatically adapt by changing their initial positioning and even regulation, which transforms their strategies in the results. However, in this plane of political analysis, the theory still lags far behind political practice and empiricism, as it mainly tends to focus on completely informal examinations and verifications of multiple correlations of electoral and other factors of the political process, as in the studies of J. Elster and W. Preuss<sup>18</sup>, A. Lijphart<sup>19</sup> and B. Geddes<sup>20</sup>, or on inductively produced thoughts, which are distracted from certain sociological and political science studies, as in the explorations of K. Benoit and J. Sheemann<sup>21</sup>, J. Ishiyama<sup>22</sup>, S. Smith and T. Remington<sup>23</sup>, as well as D. Brady and J. Moe<sup>24</sup>, and so on.

Accordingly, modern political science still lacks a single or synthesized theory that would try to regulate the idea of electoral systems and formulas as the effects of institutional and non-institutional factors in the study of electoral systems. Although, in contrast, such a theory should identify and systematically investigate the importance of cause and endogeneity of

<sup>16</sup> Riker W., The two-party system and Duverger's law, an essay on the history of political science, *"American Political Science Review"* 1982, vol 76, s. 753-766.

<sup>17</sup> Tsebelis G., *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, Wyd. University of California Press 1990

<sup>18</sup> Elster J., Offe C., Preuss U., *Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies*, Wyd. Cambridge 1998

<sup>19</sup> Lijphart A., Democratization and constitutional choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 1989-91, *"Journal of Theoretical Politics"* 1992, vol 4, Nr. 2, s. 207-223

<sup>20</sup> Geddes B., *Initiation of new democratic institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, [w:] Lijphart A., Waisman C. (eds.), *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Westview Press 1996, s. 14-52

<sup>21</sup> Benoit K., Schiemann J., Institutional choice in new democracies: bargaining over Hungary's 1989 electoral law, *"Journal of Theoretical Politics"* 2001, vol 13, nr. 2, s. 159-188

<sup>22</sup> Ishiyama J., Transitional electoral systems in post-communist Eastern Europe, *"Political Science Quarterly"* 1997, vol 112, nr. 1, s. 95-115.

<sup>23</sup> Remington T., Smith S., Political goals, institutional context and the choice of an electoral system: The Russian parliamentary election law, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1996, vol 40, nr. 4, s. 1253-1279

<sup>24</sup> Brady D., Mo J., Electoral systems and institutional choice: a case study of the 1988 Korean elections, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 1992, vol 24, nr. 4, s. 405-430

different types of electoral systems in generating a vast array of research, which instead often considers them as exogenous determinants of various policy outcomes and interactions. In addition, such a theory should usually also try to explain how political parties and / or blocs / coalitions adapt to certain institutional rules and, in turn, how institutional rules shape and influence political parties and / or blocs / coalitions, especially in in that case, until equilibrium is reached. After all, the balance achieved in this way is a factor in the institutional stability and efficiency of public institutions.

This is empirically confirmed, for example, by a very interesting and representative case that calls into question previously developed views on electoral systems, in particular the fact and process of transit to democracy / democratic political regime in most Central and Eastern European countries. Even despite the well-known theoretical assumption that the idea is that electoral systems are institutionally and extra-institutionally endogenous, as it was developed much earlier than 1989-1991, when political and institutional transformations began in Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, it is the remark of S. Rokkan, according to which numerous calculations and sociological studies attribute changes in electoral rules and systems to political and party interests and processes, and not vice versa<sup>25</sup>. Thus, Rokkan's hypothesis is that the explanation of the approval of, for example, proportional representation and proportional electoral system in Western Europe in the early twentieth century did not fit into the context of understanding the dynamic changes in electoral institutions, in particular systems, and party systems in, by contrast, the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe<sup>26</sup>. It is on this occasion that A. Lijphart<sup>27</sup>, C. Boyks<sup>28</sup>, P. Dunley and H. Margetts<sup>29</sup> argued that accounting for and taking into account this process of change means that scholars must critically review conventional and conventional concepts and features of electoral systems as institutions that "tend to be very stable and resistant to change." However, this should certainly be based on the regulatory and normative lessons of previous research on elections and transit to democracy, which explains that the introduction and application of elections and different types of electoral systems can have extremely different consequences. Based on the position of G. O'Donnell et al. Schmitter, it was found that they could have the effect of "freezing the next political events"<sup>30</sup>, establishing both institutional rules and political actors of the "democratic game" within a configuration that remains stable for further repetition and transformation in the democratic cycle.

<sup>25</sup> Rokkan S., *Citizens, Elections, Parties*, Wyd. Universitetsforlaget 1970

<sup>26</sup> Elster J., Offe C., Preuss U., *Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies*, Wyd. Cambridge 1998, s. 130.

<sup>27</sup> Lijphart A., *A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994, s. 52.

<sup>28</sup> Boix C., Setting the rules of the game: the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies, *American Political Science Review* 1999, vol 93, nr. 3, s. 609-624

<sup>29</sup> Dunleavy P., Margetts H., Understanding the dynamics of electoral reform, *International Political Science Review* 1995, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 9-29.

<sup>30</sup> O'Donnell G., Schmitter P., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1986, s. 62.

In other words, it fits into the framework of the remarks of such scientists as C. Boyks<sup>31</sup>, P. Dunleavy H. Margetts<sup>32</sup>, who state that as soon as the electoral arena becomes stable and the party system freezes over certain socio-political divisions, senior officials lose interest in changing the “electoral regime.” As a result, in Western Europe, scholars continue, extremely drastic changes in electoral laws have been rare in recent decades, at least except in those countries and nations where party systems have remained relevant and effective, but mostly representative.

But this conclusion and calculation certainly requires several important remarks, including which political parties and blocs are losing interest in changing electoral institutions, which party systems are merging or consolidating, and which remain fractional, and how they relate to each other. Moreover, the answer to these questions certainly requires the existence of the theory of institutional balance, which, in turn, requires a certain analytical model, which includes the effects of electoral institutions on parties and incentives and the ability of parties to change electoral institutions. The fact is that only a theory that explains the balance of endogenous institutions and strategically adaptive political behavior can really guarantee that it views elections and electoral systems as systems of mutual exchange of mechanisms that are balanced<sup>33</sup>. However, in contrast, formal equilibrium theories that would address the real world events and phenomena are extremely difficult to construct and operationalize. In this regard, J. Tsebelis notes that actual events in the political, in particular electoral, process tend to involve an inaccurate number of political actors and inaccurate political behavior, which in the end is difficult to style according to the structure usually required in the analytical model. can be formally proved or disproved. Thus, in contrast to strategic adaptation to institutionalized incentives, changes in attitudes toward the institutions themselves are likely to be more volatile, variable, and unusual, and therefore much less prone to generalization<sup>34</sup>.

And this, as a consequence, should be a warning and an order to abandon any attempts to apply theoretical models to change electoral systems and determine their permanence / stability. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that most explanations of changes in electoral systems in political science are usually constructed around the study of single cases or are instead excessively broad empirical generalizations that significantly destroy the variety of details and features of explanatory and analytical categories. Therefore, many researchers offer the opposite and more stable alternative and model, which should be applied even in a kind of experimental way, in particular with detailed adjustments and verifications of various analytical features that help test the analytical model in the context of many levels of analytical details. However, to apply such a model to different analytical cases, the theory assumes that the methodology

<sup>31</sup> Boix C., Setting the rules of the game: the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies, *American Political Science Review* 1999, vol 93, nr. 3, s. 609-624

<sup>32</sup> Dunleavy P., Margetts H., Understanding the dynamics of electoral reform, *International Political Science Review* 1995, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 9-29

<sup>33</sup> Benoit K., Models of electoral system change, *Electoral Studies* 2004, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 363-389

<sup>34</sup> Tsebelis G., *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, Wyd. University of California Press 1990, s. 95-96

and techniques of analysis and comparison should be shared with the technique of “analytical narratives” or with comparative statistical analysis or formal theory of institutional behavior and equilibrium. At the same time, it is clear that political science has not yet developed any alternative for analyzing institutional change, in particular with regard to electoral systems that can be grasped and understood through any approach other than trying to restore the dominance of political actors and assess alternatives which they own.

Against this background, the issue of explaining institutional and non-institutional factors and parameters of the origin of electoral systems, including within certain institutional and political circumstances, needs to be extremely important. This is especially evident given the fact that electoral institutions, in particular the institution of the electoral system, inevitably represent a certain type of political and regulatory institutions as such. Interestingly, J. Cebelis calls this electoral type of institutions a kind of “redistributive” phenomenon or institution<sup>35</sup>, bearing in mind the fact that “redistributive” institutions have the character of a game with a “zero sum”, which inevitably benefits one group in society, but for at the expense of another, in particular in contrast to institutions in the format of efficiency, which can improve the overall well-being in contrast to maintaining the established status quo. It is important that the difference between the institutional breakdown of elections and electoral systems is extremely critical, as it means that most scientific literature on the emergence and stability of political institutions and their effectiveness is not directly applicable to cases, theory and practice of origin and change of electoral laws. And this despite the fact that electoral laws and electoral systems are the most important distributive institutions that are able to improve the share and representation of one socio-political group through direct spending at the expense of other socio-political groups. In addition, alternative methods of allocating seats, which are initialized under different types of electoral laws and systems, have different distributive effects, but they are all equally effective, albeit on different criteria. Accordingly, the origins and development of electoral systems need to be explored not through the combined profits and outcomes of their effectiveness, but rather through the struggle for distribution shares that are regulated and produced by different alternatives and provide different effects on institutional and political change.

In view of this, at least three problems of the origin of electoral institutions, in particular electoral systems, can be identified in political science. First, it is important that each party or coalition / bloc involved in the choice of institutional alternatives evaluates them based primarily on the expected effect of each alternative on its own biased or unbiased political and institutional interests. Second, each party or coalition involved in the choice of institutional alternatives necessarily evaluates them based on the expected effect of each of the alternatives on the general institutional and political interest. Third, electoral institutions are formed and operationalized through a process that takes place, including outside the assessment of the consequences of systematically assessed alternatives in this regard. They are saddened by the

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<sup>35</sup> Tsebelis G., *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, Wyd. University of California Press 1990, s. 104.

fact that the concept of the obtained advantage in the institutional choice is mainly the idea that the choice of institutions takes place as the first stage of a kind of two-stage game. Moreover, in the first stage of this game, parties or blocs / coalitions conduct or benefit from testing or testing the options of alternative institutions, which are based on the expectations about payouts and results that these institutions may have in the second stage of the game<sup>36</sup>. This is complemented by the fact that the problems of the origin of electoral institutions, in particular electoral systems, are generalized in order to avoid considering electoral institutions in the format of mainly instrumental goals. The fact is that in the theory of the origin of electoral systems, the expected electoral results are defined as the consequences of the struggle of parties and / or blocs for the advantages of certain institutional and political alternatives, which are based on the expected results of the political process. Accordingly, the search for an electoral system is necessarily and directly related to the distributive shares of parties and / or coalitions in the legislature (first stage), but the legislature / legislature determines who is authorized to govern the political process and even government (second stage). Thus, virtually every party is involved in institutional choice and evaluates electoral alternatives according to its exogenous utility for political systems<sup>37</sup>.

This is despite the fact that different theories of institutional choice are closely related to the political goals of parties and blocs / coalitions, as party institutions are evaluated as alternative institutions in terms of utilitarian utility, in particular because they are analyzed to take into account their distribution shares. distribution of mandates and portfolios in power, which are therefore associated with almost every political / power institution.

Instead, only some theories and models are more general, in particular because they establish and regulate both the direct and indirect benefits of engaging with parties, blocs / coalitions, or in general, political actors in certain positions in power. Moreover, direct utility can be manifested in the format of biased government or representation of one's own constituency, while indirect utility is manifested in the form of a kind of profit or dividends from additional shares of resources determined mainly by the balance of mandates in legislatures – primarily at the national level. Accordingly, the model of seeking power, in particular with regard to defining institutions of power, differs from the model of finding political course and policy-making, in which it determines how each party or bloc / coalition will prefer institutional rules that maximize its share of legislative mandates. political goals and ideology of other parties and / or blocs. This means that any more generalized theories and models tend to best explain the political attitudes and preconditions of institutional development within certain transit parameters of the environment, especially given that the direct concern of parties about their power and political goals is maximized by legislative representation, but instead the results of the policy are positioned as secondary goals and processes that are theorized rather vaguely

<sup>36</sup> Tsebelis G., *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, Wyd. University of California Press 1990

<sup>37</sup> Benoit K., Models of electoral system change, *Electoral Studies* 2004, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 363-389.



or doubtfully. A clear reflection of such a theoretical conclusion and modeling, as noted by K. Benoit and J. Sheemann<sup>38</sup>, is, for example, the choice of electoral system in Hungary (first in the early 90's of the 20th century, and later after 2014 – author) – the so-called majority electoral system of mixed membership (as an option of a dependent mixed electoral system)<sup>39</sup>, in particular on the basis of an appeal to the idea of maximizing parliamentary seats. A similar construction of its time, in particular in 2008-2015, in the format of the so-called proportional system of mixed membership (also the option of a dependent mixed electoral system) was applied in Romania<sup>40</sup>. In addition, variable models of maximizing mandates have been used in the search for an electoral system and institutional design in post-communist Russia<sup>41</sup> and post-authoritarian Taiwan<sup>42</sup>, etc.

At the same time, a controversial option is to consider the model of personal gain of political parties and blocs or political actors in general. This model is able to explain the advantage of parties over electoral alternatives, including electoral systems, as it is derived from the expected personal income and dividends of political actors and the associated alternatives. The fact is that party leaders and individual non-partisan political actors may approve specific electoral alternatives mainly to maximize their personal gain and power or to compensate for their position through failed political moves, such as government promises or personal financial rewards. In this regard, D. Olson cites as an example the case of Poland, where in 1989, during “round table discussions”, the Polish United Workers’ Party nominated and recognized free elections to the Senate in exchange for an agreement guaranteeing the presidency of General B. Jaruzelski<sup>43</sup>. Of course, such explanations raise a number of questions about whether political parties and political actors in general behave as unitary entities. However, the personal benefit model does not link institutional benefits to the distributive shares and dividends of parties and / or blocs and the timing of governments and their policies, but mainly to maximizing the personal “welfare” of selected people involved in decision-making and adoption or development of institutional rules. In addition, political parties and political actors in general may also evaluate alternative institutions according to their preferences for expected outcomes that affect the political elite, rather than supporters or sympathizers of such parties and actors. However, in many cases, parties and / or political actors can defend their privileged interests and certain institutions by

<sup>38</sup> Benoit K., Schiemann J., Institutional choice in new democracies: bargaining over Hungary’s 1989 electoral law, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2001, vol 13, nr. 2, s. 159-188

<sup>39</sup> Renwick A., Modelling Multiple Goals: Electoral System Preferences in Hungary in 1989, *Europe-Asia Studies* 2005, vol 57, nr. 7, s. 995-1019; Szigetvári V., Tordai C., Vető B., Beyond Democracy – The model of the new Hungarian parliamentary electoral system (Part 2), *Haza és Haladás* 24 November, 2011, 14 s

<sup>40</sup> Marian G., King R., Plus ça change: Electoral law reform and the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 2010, vol 43, s. 7-18

<sup>41</sup> Remington T., Smith S., Political goals, institutional context and the choice of an electoral system: The Russian parliamentary election law, *American Journal of Political Science* 1996, vol 40, nr. 4, s. 1253-1279.

<sup>42</sup> Brady D., Mo J., Electoral systems and institutional choice: a case study of the 1988 Korean elections, *Comparative Political Studies* 1992, vol 24, nr. 4, s. 405-430

<sup>43</sup> Olson D., Political parties and party systems in regime transformation: inner transition in the new democracies of Central Europe, *American Review of Politics* 1993, vol 14, s. 619-658.

arguing that they promote the common interest. This is especially true when it comes to the exchange and relationship between representation and the governance of governance<sup>44</sup> processes, as opposed to understanding representation only on the basis of categories and principles of equity. The fact is that real representation presupposes the search for representation in the legislatures for any of the political groups, and this, in turn, requires electoral institutions that allow such groups to receive seats. This is extremely important given the fact that such groups may be sectors that represent, for example, labor or agricultural interests or ethnic, religious or national minorities in heterogeneous societies, and so on. Thus, the advantage of maximizing representation in general means, or at least should mean, maximizing the principle of electoral proportionality, in particular when making choices that affect all, not just individual parties and political actors. In addition, the outlined understanding of the advantage of the principle of proportionality is part of the construction of a model of a kind of “usefulness” of the electoral system, which is applied and tested by P. Dunleavy and Ch. Margetts<sup>45</sup>, in particular on the example, on the contrary, the permanence of the majority electoral system of a relative majority in the United Kingdom.

Thus, all this means that the “controllability” of the electoral system is a general result of electoral institutions, which also affects the political elite, not just biased political and institutional interests, because “controllability” is the backbone of the two-dimensional model of debate on electoral systems. All this means that “controllability” is focused on the political elite, not on biased interest, because it focuses on maximizing the share of seats of the largest party or political actor, and not on the share of seats of any single (additional) party or all political forces, etc.

This is complemented by the fact that the incentive to “manage” electoral systems is based on the advantages of different institutional and political alternatives, which are based on the ability to encourage reconciliation and conflict management between political competitors and socio-political groups in a given society. A clear evidence of this is the attempt, for example, by D. Horowitz<sup>46</sup> to attribute to the Sri Lankan version of the so-called “contingent” vote in 1978 the desire to promote important internal ethnic reconciliation within a multiparty system. Another case is the situation regarding the rules of the presidential election in Nigeria, according to which, according to the 1978 constitution, political actors were interested in creating ethnically inclusive government coalitions<sup>47</sup>. Therefore, in cases where conflict management is the main and determining factor, such and similar institutional and political motivations may work to reject or even deny all other criteria for choosing a particular electoral system. At the same time, among the additional factors creating obstacles or

<sup>44</sup> Benoit K., Models of electoral system change, *“Electoral Studies”* 2004, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 363-389

<sup>45</sup> Dunleavy P., Margetts H., Understanding the dynamics of electoral reform, *“International Political Science Review”* 1995, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 9-29

<sup>46</sup> Horowitz D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Wyd. University of California 1985, s. 639-641

<sup>47</sup> Horowitz D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Wyd. University of California 1985

adjusting elements of electoral motivation, it is expedient to single out such tasks as initiating and securing accessible and meaningful elections<sup>48</sup>, and therefore appealing to the general or common desire to choose electoral institutions that inevitably increase political participation efficiency. This includes, for example, design systems that are convenient in the context of minimizing “wasted votes” and thus provide meaningful identification between voters and their representatives.

It is also important that the general problems of the institutional engineering of electoral systems may include and predict the administrative capacity and efficiency of electoral systems. Interestingly, these issues tend to appear more often in the rhetoric of political actors about reforming electoral systems, rather than about the actual adoption of political decisions in this context.

Moreover, when such problems of election administration really determine the established political / non-institutional and institutional alternatives, they are inevitably in the paradigm of understanding and determining the final form of institutions, which are selected in a broad form for various, not necessarily administrative, reasons. In this context, it is appropriate to appeal to so-called “privileged” theories of the origin of electoral systems, which include many explanations of the endogeneity and conditionality of electoral formulas, including those in which the choice is conscious, and those that explain institutional and extra-institutional changes as a product of the influence of socio-political forces and groups that do not necessarily focus on certain “agents” of the political process and the delegation of authority and responsibility. Therefore, the key feature that characterizes all explanations of this type is that virtually all institutional alternatives are not evaluated systematically and generalized, but based solely on their theorized and expected consequences, and therefore are positioned as central or based on the positions of certain actors in the political process<sup>49</sup>. In this regard, J. Elster, K. Offe and W. Preuss in “Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies”<sup>50</sup> emphasize the fact that in countries experiencing a return to democracy after periods of authoritarian rule, identified “designers” of legislation, including the constitutional one, can be involved in drafting election laws mainly on the basis of their previous experience during all available attempts and stages of democratization, as a result of which the political context significantly overcomes pressure and crisis of political opponents, and electoral legislation, in particular on electoral systems, is perceived as a “central” issue of institutional and political importance. In addition, the facts that even a return to historically preceding electoral institutions, including electoral systems, can be a very attractive symbol of the rejection or denial of an existing or previous political regime is quite significant. A clear example of this is the fact that, for example, some parties in the transitional Grand National Assembly in Bulgaria (during 1990-1992) argued that the

<sup>48</sup> Reynolds A., Reilly B., *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, Wyd. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 1997

<sup>49</sup> Benoit K., Models of electoral system change, *“Electoral Studies”* 2004, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 363-389

<sup>50</sup> Elster J., Offe C., Preuss U., *Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies*, Wyd. Cambridge 1998, s. 62

constitution adopted in 1991 resembled the constitution of 1879, i.e. the first constitution of liberal and independent Bulgaria. K. Angelbrekt even stated that “the return to the constitution of 1879 signaled a complete break with the communist legacy and contributed to the restoration of some positive aspects of communist political traditions”<sup>51</sup>, which inevitably influenced the construction of electoral procedures and the electoral system in Bulgaria.

In a minimized or microscopic theoretical context and scale, historical precedents can also influence certain elements and segments of electoral systems that can be adapted and applied to historically important political and institutional issues, including the boundaries of administrative boundaries and territories of states. Accordingly, instead of debating districts or regions on the basis of public relations, for example, in the same Bulgarian or Hungarian electoral systems, these districts or regions were formed or reproduced around pre-existing boundaries of local government. In a less defined and more general scale and context, historical explanations of precedents may also include what T. Frye<sup>52</sup> called conditions of “cultural approaches” that encompass not only institutions or the so-called “trajectory of previous development” but also dependence on general and “institutionalized culture”, imposed on the nature and features of previous political regimes. In this regard, K. Jovitt<sup>53</sup>, for example, by subtracting post-communist political regimes in Eastern Europe, was able to attribute to changes and attributes of institutional development the degree of inheritance of the regimes of “real socialism” or Leninism.

In contrast, sociological explanations of electoral institutions shift attention from political agents and actors and their preferences mainly to the goals within which electoral institutions, including electoral systems, are established. Thus, S. Rokkan qualified his initial hypothesis about the influence of ethnic and religious minorities on electoral institutions by emphasizing that early and initial steps towards public relations took place in the most ethnically diverse and heterogeneous societies and countries in Europe<sup>54</sup>. In turn, Horowitz<sup>55</sup> also noted that ethnic or ethno linguistic issues may be central to the design of electoral systems, although the researcher’s calculation was largely aimed at offering a more conscious choice of institutional, including electoral, alternatives, which are primarily related to the expected consequences, and institutional and non-institutional / political. In general, sociological explanations of electoral institutions tend to omit or at least downplay the importance of conscious and streamlined consideration of electoral alternatives, in particular simply by linking the emergence of certain electoral institutions and frameworks to the effects of multiple convergent or centrifugal forces. On this basis, R. Dahl and E. Taft<sup>56</sup>, for example, state that as a result of measurement and

<sup>51</sup> Engelbrekt K., The Grand National Assembly to adopt a new constitution, “*RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe*” 1991, s. 7.

<sup>52</sup> Frye T., A politics of institutional choice: post-communist presidencies, “*Comparative Political Studies*” 1997, vol 39, nr. 5, s. 523-552.

<sup>53</sup> Jovitt K., *New World Disorder: the Leninist Extinction*, Wyd. University of California Press 1992

<sup>54</sup> Rokkan S., *Citizens, Elections, Parties*, Wyd. Universitetsforlaget 1970, s. 157

<sup>55</sup> Horowitz D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Wyd. University of California 1985.

<sup>56</sup> Dahl R., Taft E., *Size and Democracy*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1973.

comparison it is possible to construct and modify not only the form of electoral systems, but also a kind of “electoral regimes”.

This conclusion is supplemented and partially assimilated on the basis of economic approaches to elucidating institutional and non-institutional factors explaining the conditionality and origin of electoral systems, i.e. their economic determinants. Thus, R. Rogowski<sup>57</sup> argues that the more economically advanced the state depends on foreign trade, the more it is delayed to use public relations and certain administrative factors of institutionalization of election procedures. This is due to the fact that the movement away from public relations is determined by the convergence of pressure towards “free trade groups” seeking to maximize the isolation of the state, as well as towards strong parties seeking to increase state autonomy and the need for political and socio-economic stability.

Finally, the technocratic explanation of electoral institutes is important when the institutes are initiated, tested, and verified by an expert or group of experts on technical or administrative grounds. At the same time, examples of completely technocratic grounds for initiating and forming electoral institutions are positioned as extremely rare, but they can still explain the adoption of certain elements of electoral systems, especially complex features of formulas of relations of electoral systems with public or administrative-territorial division of a country. Moreover, the cost of understanding such factors for many decision-makers may simply outweigh the perception of the potential benefits of the results, especially of a political nature. For example, the choice of public relations formula in the 1989 Hungarian election law was delegated by “roundtable” mediators to a small group of experts seeking to understand the significance of this component of the electoral institution and involving technical criteria for selecting appropriate options<sup>58</sup>. By analogy, the electoral system of a single transitional vote in Ireland was also chosen, apparently without a systematic and comprehensive consideration of other alternatives, and largely because of Lord Coyartney Penvit’s visit to Dublin in 1911. He convinced A. Griffith, the founder of the Sinn Fein party, of the advantages of a single transitional electoral system, which was later adopted in a free Irish state with almost no significant debate<sup>59</sup>.

Finally, the explanation of electoral institutions cannot be ignored without taking into account certain external or exogenous factors that, outside the national political context and even legislation, determine the choice of certain institutions within certain electoral and political systems in general. In this regard, A. Blacy L. Massicott<sup>60</sup> see among the examples the imposition or distortion of electoral laws by usurping or occupying political power, for example, after military defeat or annexation / occupation, or the succession of electoral institutions from colonial rulers and metropolises. In addition, somewhat newer calculations also explore the role of international political and financial

<sup>57</sup> Rogowski R., Trade and the variety of democratic institutions, *“International Organization”* 1987, vol 41, s. 203-224.

<sup>58</sup> Benoit K., Schiemann J., Institutional choice in new democracies: bargaining over Hungary’s 1989 electoral law, *“Journal of Theoretical Politics”* 2001, vol 13, nr. 2, s. 159-188.

<sup>59</sup> Carstairs A., *A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe*, Wyd. Allen and Unwin 1980

<sup>60</sup> Blais A., Massicotte L., Electoral formulas: a macroscopic perspective, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1997, vol 32, s. 107-129.

organizations in the formation of electoral institutions. This may be the case, for example, with the formation of the Lithuanian election law in 1992, the commemoration of which is often attributed primarily to international organizations, rather than to internal parties and political actors in Lithuania<sup>61</sup>. Finally, consideration of the factors of origin, choice and establishment of electoral systems by the category of specific or special influences, which includes the adoption and approval of electoral institutions due to various causes of the accident, whims and mistakes of political power or political actors in general, and other circumstances, which can be regarded as historically unique. However, these factors definitely need more detailed consideration, which should be aimed at a separate and more detailed study.

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